Abstract-Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of many sensors working as hosts. These sensors can sense a phenomenon and represent it in a form of data. There are many applications for WSNs such as object tracking and monitoring where the objects need protection. Providing an efficient location privacy solution would be challenging to achieve due to the exposed nature of the WSN. The communication protocol needs to provide location privacy measured by anonymity, observability, capture-likelihood and safety period. We extend this work to allow for countermeasures against semi-global and global adversaries. We present a network model that is protected against a sophisticated passive and active attacks using local, semi-global, and global adversaries.
implementation of intrusion detection system (IDS) [10] . We assume a global adversary which can monitor the traffic of the entire network and can determine the node responsible for the initial transmission. We also assume that the adversary is capable of observing sensors' transmissions over extended periods of time. It is, however, not able to break the encryption algorithm or the hash functions adopted in the protocol.
IV. PROPOSED ANONYMOUS MODEL
The communication process is divided into three phases, namely: deployment, icebreaker, and communication phases.
A. Deployment phase:
Prior to actual distribution of the sensors in the field of application, the sensors need to be tested, fully charged, and loaded with the parameters which are needed during the setup phase and then during the communication phase.
B. Icebreaker phase
In this phase, sensors get to know about their location and surroundings. Typically, WSN is considered secure for some short period of time after the deployment of sensors and before the steady communication phase. Zhu et al. [11] presented that WSN has Tmin, which is the shortest time that the adversary needs to be able to compromise a sensor. During this time, the sensors can communicate and exchange all needed information, such as preloaded parameters as well as some calculated parameters. The sink needs to know the location of all the sensors participating in the WSN. Likewise, the sensors need to know their relative locations to the sink and to the neighboring sensors. There are many localization schemes which are proposed in the literature [6] . After the localization process is completed, each sensor Si will know its hcisk, the smallest hop-count to the sink. All parameters and terms are listed in TABLE I.
1) Creating Pseudonyms A sensor needs to use one disposable ID per one transmission which means, the sensor uses any issued pseudonym only once. There are five kinds of transmissions that could happen during the communication phase: (i) multi-hop transmission to the sink, (ii) transmission between two neighbors, (iii) broadcast sent by S i or the sink, (iv) acknowledgement, and (v) dummy packet broadcast. The process starts by creating a pseudonym for each sensor S i , we call it for short (SID i ) which is computed using expression (1): 
Then, S i calculates the dummy broadcast pseudonym ID (DSID i ) according the following expression:
S i should, by now, know its entire neighbors set N i . A neighbor S j is a sensor that could receive signal from the S i and vice versa through one-hop transmission. S i will send a broadcast discovery message (DISC), to exchange parameters with all one-hop neighbors as below:
Where TTL=1 for this transmission. S i will receive also a similar broadcast message from S j and from all other neighbors. Both S i and S j will calculate a new random value (α ij ) according to expressions below:
Both S i and S j will calculate also a new pair-wise key k ij according to expression below:
S i also calculates broadcast pseudonym ID for S j (BSID j ) according to expression (2) since S i has already received the values of ID j and β j through DISC. It also calculates the onehop pseudonym ID (HSID ij ) shared between S i and S j as in the expression below:
Finally, acknowledgement pseudonym ID for S i (ASID i ) will be calculated according to the expression below: 2) Deleting security information After storing all required pseudonyms, parameters and keys in T i for S i, it would be the time to delete all unnecessary information for the purpose of security. In addition, it will release some memory storage space [9, 12] . Most importantly, S i will delete ID i and hc isk , which could be critical information for the adversary. In addition, S i shall delete discovery messages received earlier from the neighbors.
C. Communication phase
During the communication phase, when sending data to the sink takes place, there are seven operations that continue until the network dies. These operations are: sense and send a packet to a neighbor, forward a packet hop-by-hop, broadcast a real packet, acknowledgement, broadcast a dummy packet, a sensor cancelation, and a new sensor deployment. A sensor can have three roles, in terms of data transmission, during the communication phase: 
1)
Sensing data S i only recognizes itself by its newly calculated pseudonym (SID i ), and the sink can recognize source of the packet through SID i identity as well. Thus, the SID i of the source needs to be included in the packet until it reaches to the sink. Consequently, the SID of S i will be updated after every transmission. When data is sensed and ready to be sent along, S i needs to select one neighbor to forward the message to. The selection process goes through a probabilistic protocol which guarantees that S i does not depend all the time on one neighbor for routing privacy and for increasing the lifetime of the WSN. S i will form the message in the following format:
Once S i knows that the packet (M ij ) is delivered to the sink, it needs to dispose the current pseudonym SID i and issue a new one for the next transmission as below:
In addition, both S i and S j will dispose the current HSID ij and issue a new one for the next communication between the two sensors as below:
The packet M will then be reformatted by the recipient S j and again forwarded to the next node, in the path, S r and so on, until it gets to the sink. If S j was the sink, then it uses the shared one-hop key between itself and the neighboring sensor, to decrypt the data and gets the SID i which the it can use to recognize S i . Thus, the sink will be able to recognize the originator of this message. Only at this point of time, it can update the value of SID i of S i . It also gets the data (D i ) which it can read after decrypting it using k isk .
2) Forwarding data When S i sends the message one-hop uplink to the neighbor S j , S j needs to forward the message to another intermediary node. Upon receiving M ij , S j will match HSID ij in its table, T j . If there is no match, then the message will be dropped immediately. If it matches, then the message will be decrypt using k ij . The message will be forwarded to S r after M is reformatted as below:
Right after the data is received by S j and forwarded to the next one-hop S r , the S j updates both pseudonyms, HSID ij and HSID jr . S j now is ready to exchange another message with S i using the new pseudonym HSID ij . However, S j is not yet ready to send data to S r since S r does not update the HSID jr until D i is forwarded to the next hop, say NS v .
3) Acknowledgement: As expected in data networks, a packet could get lost or corrupted. In either case, retransmission is required. Because sensors change SIDs after each transmission, synchronizing SIDs is crucial. Updating the pseudonyms depends on successful message transmission and reception. Technically, a sender and a receiver, should alter the pseudonym value only after making sure the data was sent correctly and received perfectly by the sink. The lack of direct connection between the sender and the receiver makes it a complicated process. S i needs to calculate acknowledgement pseudonym ID (ASID i ) according to the expression below:
The message will be sent out now with the current value for ASID i . Thus, we will rewrite M ij as it appears below:
Padding is added to make sure all the one-hop packets have the same size to prevent ADV from identifying the source by traffic analysis and size correlation attacks. When S j receives the packet, it will reformat the packet as below and then send it to S r :
The transmission of M jr should be heard by all the neighbors including both S i and S r . If S i hears the message and reads ASID i , the S i knows that M ij was received correctly by S j . Only at this time S i updates the value of HSID ij . SID i will get updated, as well, since S i is the source of the message. Here are two scenarios:
Scenario 1: The packet sent by S i is lost or corrupted. In this case, S j will not forward any message onward. Meanwhile, S i will wait for ω time to expire. It will send the message again with updated ASID i . Once the message is acknowledged according to the procedure explained earlier, and if S i is the source, then SID i , HSID i and ASID i will be updated. If it is intermediary sensor, only HSID i and ASID i get updated.
Scenario 2:
The packet is received correctly by S j , the new packet M jr is sent out including the acknowledgement ASID i , and S j updated the value of HSID ij . However, S i does not hear the forwarded message M jr within time ω. At this moment S i does not know for sure if the packet was delivered, or the acknowledgement is lost. A copy of the message will be retransmitted to S j with the current HSID i and updated ASID i . S j can recognize the message because of the value of old HSID i . After receiving the retransmitted packet, it now sends direct acknowledgement to S i as below:
Sink is treated similar to a normal sensor, so it has to acknowledge every packet it receives. After the packet is delivered to the sink, and after the message is acknowledged, the SID i (of the source) will be updated. Both S i and the sink will be ready to exchange a new message. As long the new message does not reach the sink before the old SID i gets updated, the system will continue to be synchronized. This way, we have a possible window of one message. However, there is no guarantee to have all messages arrive in order or within the window time. One way to do it is if the system accounts for minimum interval time  min which is the minimum time span between two messages. However, in some cases, the packet cannot be delivered at all through a certain route. One obvious scenario is when an intermediate node gets depleted out of energy before it forwards the message onward. The message needs to be rerouted through a different intermediate node which could cause a sever delay. We suggest to implement a sliding window mechanism as exhibited in Error! Reference source not found.. For each sensor, we can have a window of W size. If we have k bits for the sequence number of the SID, then we can have a sliding window of 2 k -1 slots. That means the sink can receive up to W messages out of order. The window cannot slide ahead until the SIDs received earlier are all in order. We don't need to create a sliding window in the sensor side because there is no direct acknowledgement coming from the sink. Once the sink finds out that the sequence of SIDs is not in sync, it will send a message to resynchronize itself with the sensor.
4) Broadcasting data:
Typically, the sink is required to broadcast messages for control and management purposes. Likewise, a sensor might need to broadcast a message to the sink for network setup, maintenance and other management issues. A sensor could, as well, broadcast a message for emergency or urgency reasons depending on the application at hand. The framework requires keeping all the packets, transmitted throughout the network, indistinguishable. Thus, all the messages need to have similar size. Each sensor is preloaded with a broadcast key (kb i ) and assigned broadcast pseudonym ID (BSID i ). The broadcast message sent by S i is formatted as in the expression below:
The broadcast message from a source S i will be received by all the neighbors in N i . S i and the recipients will update BSID i according to the expression below:
Upon receiving the broadcast message, S j decrypts the message using the stored key (kb i ) in the table T j . It then encrypts it again using kb j and broadcasts the message to its one-hop neighbors set (N j ) as in expression below: When the sink receives a broadcast message, it is ultimately the destination so intuitively it does not need to broadcast the message again. Our proposed framework assumes that the sink behaves like normal sensor. To maintain this requiremnt, we require the sink to broadcast the message again. Thus, we introduce the limited broadcast where the sink will broadcast only to one hop with TTL=1. Likewise, to reduce the unnecessary traffic, we have required the intermediary nodes to rebroadcast only to the neighbors with smaller hc in case of uplink messages, and to neighbors with bigger hc in case of downlink messages.
5) Broadcasting dummy packets:
The sensors need to send dummy packets to prevent time correlation attack and statistical analysis. The rate of the dummy packets follow a certain protocol. Dummy message is a one-hop broadcast message. However, to prevent correlation, the message needs to behave similar to real messages. So, the message needs to be encrypted and have similar size similar to other messages. This will make the dummy packets indistinguishable from the real packets. Since it has to carry a dummy data, we chose to make it carry residual energy () of the source sensor. This information will be extracted by the recipient neighbors and saved in the related tuple in the table T. The dummy broadcast message sent by S i is explained in the expression below:
The dummy broadcast message from S i will be received by all the neighbors in N i . S i and the recipients will then update DSID i according to the expression below:
There is no need to worry about the pseudonym synchronization since the main purpose of dummy message is to show activity in idle sensors to obfuscate real messages.
D. Sensor cancelation and addition
If S i needs to be canceled from WSN, it sends two messages requesting cancelation. The first message is to the sink as below:
The tuple of the S i in the sink tables will be removed. The S i will also send a broadcast message to the neighbors according to the expression below:
Once the neighbors get the message D cancel , they will delete the tuple related to S i from the tables. To add S i to the network, it will be preloaded with all setup parameters: ID u , α u , β u , γ u , H, k usk and kb u , and kdb u . Right after deployment, S i calculates the shared parameters with its neighbors. Before sharing the calculated parameters with the S i , the neighbors authenticate the new sensor. The sink will send authentication key k add to all sensors. S i will be preloaded with the same key as well. S i and the neighbors will use the key to authenticate with each other. Initially, the sink sends the following message to all of its one-hop neighbors as below:
Where D add is expressed below:
The initial value for hc is 0 where it represents the hop count. It will be incremented every time the message is forwarded.
V. SIMULATION AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
We need to analyze our solution for both passive and active adversary attacks. Sensors use pseudonyms to identify each other instead of using real IDs. The real ID's are not stored in the sensors and each pseudonym is used only once. Sensed data in the packets is encrypted all the way from the source to the destination. For eavesdropping and content analysis, ADV can intercept messages without being able to analyze them because data is encrypted. The only information the adversary can get of the captured packet is the pseudonyms: HSID, BSID or DSID which are all temporary and have no use except to calculate new pseudonyms. However, the adversary cannot get important parameters α ij , β i or γ i which are required to calculated new pseudonyms. For hop-by-hop trace, the adversary can track stream of messages from one node to another by overhearing transmitted data. The ADV will be faced with many real and dummy identical transmissions throughout the space and lifetime of the network. Furthermore, each node would retransmit through different routes and the message changes entirely after each transmission. For size correlation, ADV will not be able to understand relationship between incoming and outgoing packets by analyzing message sizes since all the messages have commensurate size. For identity correlation, ADV cannot relate overheard identities to sensors since they use different pseudonyms every time a message is transmitted. For rate monitoring, ADV tries to find different transmission rates in the network such as having higher transmission rate nearby the BS spatial location or at particular periods of time. This is handled by issuing dummy messages all over the network to maintain similar transmission rate chronically and spatially. If ADV compromises S i physically, then it captures two sets of information: information related to the node and information related to the neighbors. The ADV would have all it needs to issue pseudonyms and send messages out to neighbors. Let's look closely at few scenarios. Scenario 1: If the adversary physically compromises S i , and if S j and S r ∈ N i , so S i knows some information about both S j and S r . However, it cannot reproduce important information such as a jr which is required for one-hop communication between S j and S r [9] because S i would need ID j and ID r which are both deleted of the sensors. If S i hears a message, it cannot determine, with high confidence, the sender among neighbors while communicating with each other. If S i receives message from sources ∉ N i , then it would not be able to determine the source. Scenario 2: If the adversary physically compromises multiple sensors, let's call it set CS, and collects number of messages, let's call it set CM. Then, the number of compromised SIDs equal to CM since each message has unique SID. If the source S i ∉ CS, then ADV cannot know the source sensor [13] . Scenario 3: If the message sent by source S i as in scenario 2 passes thought S j ∈ CS or even through multiple compromised sensors, it will not be able to correlate the captured SID i to S i . Scenario 4: If a message sent by source S i and ∀ S ∈ N i is also ∈ CS (all neighbors are compromised), then the adversary will be able to know that S i is the source. It is unrealistic situation to have many compromised nodes in one area. However, this proves that few compromised sensors cannot locate the identity of the source. In addition, a compromised sensor does not actually need to locate the sources within its range since it can detect the objects of interest (Panda) knowing that ultimate goal is to capture the object not the sensor reporting the object. SLP and SinkLP are achieved at first by having successful source, link and sink anonymity which was explained earlier.
The adversary cannot learn any information from the intercepted packets. Passive attacks will not endanger the location privacy. However, severe active attacks could hinder the location privacy if the WSN does not have IDS. By using dummy messages at variable interval times, it becomes hard for the adversary to correlated messages being transmitted over the network. Although shortest path routing is used in this framework, selecting the next hop is done according to a probabilistic algorithm which accounts for the residual energy levels and usage frequency to increase the routing privacy. The adversary cannot relate routes to sensors. Even if two messages follow the same route, the adversary will see them as if they are two different routes since each node along the route has different SIDs. The location safety period which is the period between capturing the first packet and finding out the location of the source or the sink. It is measured as the ratio between the period of discovering the location and the interval period [25] . We have implemented a WSN of 300 sensor nodes uniformly distributed over 200 x 200 area. Fig.  2 shows that E 2 AC provides better source safety period. Fig.  3 shows that E 2 AC also provides better sink safety period. However, the source safety period is much more than the sink safety period in both schemes. It is always harder to achieve SinkLP due to the volume of transmissions nearby the sink. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our solution provides source, link and sink anonymity, SLP and SinkLP. This work addressed local and global adversary network view. It handles both passive and active attack models. Anonymity cannot provide temporal privacy. To provide temporal privacy, dummy messages were introduced. We showed how our solution improved safety period for both SLP and SinkLP. The future work would include enhancement on the probabilistic scheme for dummy messages usage. It also will account for using dummy packets to provide efficient power consumption.
